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BLIND JUSTICE OR JUST BLINDNESS?
JAMES G. MCCONNELL*
A man cannot see by another's eye, nor hear by another's ear, no
more can a man conclude or infer the thing to be resolved by an-
other's understanding or reasoning.
--Vaughn, C.J., Bushell's Case
1 Vaug. 135, 148 (1670)
The right to trial by jury is not a right of the members of the gen-
eral public to service on juries; rather it is the right of litigants to sub-
mit their disputes to juries for determination. It is only the litigants,
not the jurors or prospective jurors, who may complain about the ex-
clusion of a particular person or class of persons from jury service.'
This paper will examine Professor Kaiser's hypothesis that a blind
juror can provide the same contribution to the deliberations of a jury in
reaching its verdict, based on the law, the evidence, and the observa-
tions and experiences of the jurors in the affairs of life,2 as a sighted
juror. Careful consideration of the role of each juror in receiving,
weighing and deliberating over all the evidence presented by both par-
ties at a trial demonstrates that the perceptually handicapped juror can-
not bring the same independence of reflection and judgment to his task
as the juror who can see and hear.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The Magna Carta3 and the constitutions of the United States4 and
of every state5 provide for the preservation of the right to trial by jury.
* Attorney, Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar, and Poust, in Chicago, IL.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (1982); Matter of Archulta, 432 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
2. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 1.04; Steinberg v. Northern Illi-
nois Telephone Co., 260 Ill. App. 538 (2d Dist. 1931).
3. MAGNA CtARTA REGIS JOHANNIS XXXIX.29 (i215):
No freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any
way destroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, excepting
by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the land.
4. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
5. ALA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 11; ALAS. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 23;
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23; CONN. CONST. art. 1,
§§ 8, 19; DEL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 4, 7; FLA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 16, 22; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, 11;
HAWAII CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 14; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST.
art. I, §§ 13, 20; IOWA CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS §§ 5, 10; Ky. CONST.
§§ 7, 11; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17; ME. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 20; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS arts. 5, 21; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XV; MICH. CONST. art. I, §§ 14, 20, art. 4, § 44; MINN.
CONST. art. 1, §§ 4, 6; MIss. CONST. art. 3, §§ 26, 31; Mo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 18(a), 22(a); MONT.
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Varying interpretations of the meaning of "trial by jury" have led to
provisions for juries of fewer than 12 members,6 as well as verdicts by
fewer than all the jurors.7 Nevertheless, several states still require a
unanimous verdict of 12 jurors.8 Certain jurisdictions permit less than
unanimous verdicts only after deliberations have continued for a speci-
fied period of time.9 These provisions are designed to insure that the
verdict is the result of concensus following mature deliberation, rather
than a hasty popular vote on the issues.
Contrary to popular mythology, jurors did not evolve out of wit-
nesses who were to decide cases based upon their personal knowledge
of the facts.' 0 Jurors were not eye-witnesses to the events in question I I
but were to bring in a verdict based on the evidence received from
those who did have knowledge of the facts.' 2 The only time a juror
could rely on his own personal knowledge was in defense of a bill of
attainder for returning a false verdict. ' Once the procedure of attain-
der was replaced with the procedure of a new trial in cases where ver-
CONST. art. II, §§ 24, 26; NEB. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 11; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. 1,
arts. 16, 20; N.J. CONST. art. 1, $$ 9, 10; N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 12, 14; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2;
N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 24, 25; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 10; OKLA. CONST.
art. 2, §§ 19, 20; ORE. CONST. art. I, §§ II, 17; PA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 9; R.I. CONST. art. 1, §§ 10,
15; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6, 7; TENN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 9; TEX.
CONST. art. 1, §§ 10, 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1, arts. 10, 12; VA. CONST.
art. I, §§ 8, 11; WASH. CONST. art. 1, §§ 21, 22; W.VA. CONST. art. 3, §§ 13, 14; Wis. CONST. art. I,
§§ 5, 7; WYo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 9, 10.
6. ALAS. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11, 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 23; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7; IOWA
CONST. art. 1, § 9; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17; MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 46, art. 6 § 28; Mo. CONST. art.
II, § 28; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23; N.J. CONST. art. 1, 1 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.D.
CONST. art. 1, § 13; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 19; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 23; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 9.
7. ALAS. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11, 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 23; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7; CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 7; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 13; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17;
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 14; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; Mo. CONST. art. II, § 28; MONT. CONST. art.
III, § 23; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 3; N.J. CONST. art. 1, $ 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 19; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 21; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
8. See MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 5; N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 24, 25; Dixon v.
State, 27 Ala. App. 64, 167 So. 340 (1936); Liska v. Chicago Rys., 318 In. 570, 149 N.E. 469 (1925);
Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Harvey, 209 Ind. 262, 198 N.E. 782 (1935); State v. Simons, 61 Kan.
752, 60 P. 1052 (1900), overruled on other grounds, Leathers v. Dillon, 156 Kan. 132, 131 P.2d 668
(1942); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 823, 299 S.W. 982 (Ct. App. 1927); Gallo v. Common-
wealth, 343 Mass. 397, 179 N.E.2d 231 (1961); Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial
Court, 41 N.H. 550 (1860); Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 198 A. 99 (1938); Wellitz v.
Thomas, 122 Pa. Super. 438, 185 A. 864 (1936); Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 628, 278
A.2d 852 (1971); State v. Hall, 137 S.C. 261, 101 S.E. 662 (1919).
9. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
10. See POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, 139-40, 622, 628-29
(2d Ed. 1898).
11. See id. at 627.
12. Id. at 627-28.
13. III BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 374-75 (1768).
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dicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence, all reliance upon
personal knowledge by jurors disappeared. l4
Rights of Litigants
The litigant who owns the right to submit his case to a jury for
determination also has the right to insist that the prospective jurors
called to serve are chosen from among a body of people which is a
reasonable cross section of the community in which the trial takes
place.' 5 This "cross section" requirement applies only to the group or
groups from which prospective jurors are chosen, however. There is no
requirement that every jury contain a cross section of the community
within its twelve or fewer members.16 Once a body of prospective ju-
rors has been called, each litigant has the right to remove from the
group those individuals whose bias,' 7 interest' 8 or prejudice' 9 would
prevent them from being fair to both sides. In addition to these chal-
lenges for cause, each litigant has a limited number of peremptory
challenges which can be used to remove prospective jurors who, in his
private opinion, cannot or will not be fair to him.20 Thus the process of
jury selection strives to assure not only fairness in fact but also the ap-
pearance of fairness to the litigants. No citizen has the right to insist
that he be selected to sit on a particular jury.
Any examination of the question whether perceptually handi-
capped jurors should be forced upon litigants who do not want them
must begin with the understanding that the right to trial by jury is a
right of the litigants, not a right of prospective jurors to serve. Since
citizens generally have no right to insist on being included in a jury
panel, why should any particular class of citizens have such a right?
Perceptual Deficiencies And The Presentation of Evidence
One main goal of the trial lawyer in presenting his case to a jury is
to have each juror retain as much as possible of the evidence he
presents until the jury deliberations are concluded by the return of a
14. Id. at 375.
15. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
16. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2) and (4) (1982). See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
18. State v. Riley, 151 W.Va. 364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1967); Butler v. Talge, 516 S.W.2d 824
(Mo. App. 1974); Commonwealth v. Sabilosky, 352 Mass. 153, 224 N.E.2d 197 (1967).
19. People v. Hobbs, 35 Ill. 2d 263, 220 N.E.2d 469 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967);
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(3); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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verdict. In order to accomplish this result, civil and criminal trial law-
yers since the time of Earl Rogers have presented evidence both
through the spoken word and through exhibits which can be seen and
even handled by the jurors.21 In spite of Professor Kaiser's assertions
that a blind or deaf juror can perceive and retain evidence as well as
jurors without perceptual handicaps, the fact is that the perceptually
handicapped juror is much less likely to retain any major portion of the
facts presented through the end of jury deliberations.
Research shows that when information is presented through the
spoken word alone, seventy percent of the information can be recalled
after three hours, but only ten percent can be remembered after three
days. 22 When the same information is presented through visual means
alone, retention increases slightly to seventy-two percent after three
hours, and only twenty percent after three days.23 Remarkably, how-
ever, when the information is presented through both spoken and vis-
ual means, retention rises dramatically to eighty-five percent after three
hours, and to a startling sixty-five percent after three days. 24 Thus, the
juror who can perceive the evidence only through hearing it, or only
through seeing it, is at a demonstrable disadvantage not only in his
initial ability to assimilate all the evidence presented, but also in his
ability to retain any significant portion of what he has perceived until
the jury retires at the end of the case to deliberate.
Perceptual Deficiencies And Deliberation Of The Jury
When all the evidence, argument and instructions have been
presented, the jurors retire for private deliberations before voting on a
verdict in the case. During these deliberations, each juror is supposed
to express to the others his views on the evidence, and how the law
applies to it.25 Each juror must consider his own views in light of the
views expressed by the others in voting on the verdict to be returned.26
Professor Kaiser emphasizes what he claims to be a blind person's
ability to judge credibility of testimony in spite of the impossibility of
21. See, e.g., People v. Bannon, 59 Cal. App. 50, 209 P. 1029 (1922); People v. O'Brien, 78
Cal. 41, 20 P. 359 (1888).
22. M. DOMBROFF, DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE 4 (1983).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CIVIL 1.01, 1.02.
26. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896); United States v. Furlong, 194 F.2d 1, 2-3
(7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 950 (1952); Tomoya Kawakita v. United States, 190 F.2d
506, 521-28 (9th Cir. 1951), affd, 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Hoagland v. Chestnut Farms Dairy, Inc., 72
F.2d 729, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Hill v. Wabash R. Co., I F.2d 626, 631-33 (8th Cir. 1924).
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observing the demeanor of the witness on the stand. Even if we believe
this can be done, the use of sight to watch a witness while testifying is
only one small aspect of the visual perception of evidence in a modem
trial. Nearly every case tried before a jury involves physical or demon-
strative evidence which must be seen to be understood-from the sim-
ple photograph to the elaborate, three dimensional moving model of
two aircraft colliding. Professor Kaiser asserts that he, as a blind juror,
can arrive at an understanding of this kind of visual evidence through
descriptions and arguments provided by counsel, witnesses, the court
and other jurors. He uses the example of fingerprint comparison
evidence.
Taking Professor Kaiser's own example, let's examine in detail the
position of the blind juror during deliberations in that case. Suppose
the defendant whose fingerprint is in question is being tried by twelve
jurors in a jurisdiction where nine jurors may return a verdict of con-
viction. The prosecution has offered a complete fingerprint taken from
the defendant, and a partial print taken from the gun. The prosecution
has argued that the prints are identical, and has pointed out six areas of
specific similarity. Defense counsel has argued that the prints are dif-
ferent, and has pointed out six areas of incongruity.
Upon retiring, electing a foreman, and some preliminary discus-
sion about the case, eight jurors conclude that the prints are the same,
while three are persuaded that they are different. It is up to the blind
juror to decide the prisoner's fate. Given a reasonable difference of
opinion among the sighted jurors over the question whether the finger-
prints are the same, how does the blind juror decide which way to vote?
Does he merely count heads?
If so, then the parties have been deprived of the twelfth juror's
independent resolution of the disputed issue. If not, whom does the
blind juror ask? Both sides have presented fingerprint experts who dis-
agree in their conclusions. Eleven unbiased jurors have drawn differ-
ent inferences from the same evidence, which they were all able to see
themselves. How can the one juror who cannot see the disputed finger-
prints resolve this controversy?
It is impossible for him to do so without relying either on another
juror, or on a thirteenth person who is not a member of the jury. Thus,
instead of the jury of twelve provided by law, we have a decision by
eleven or by thirteen--something neither party sought when asking for
trial by jury.
Professor Kaiser also relies heavily upon the argument that blind
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jurors must be forced upon the parties because some jurisdictions have
blind judges. Yet the right to trial by jury protects the litigants from
being compelled to submit their dispute to a blind trier of fact. No one
can be compelled to have a bench trial before that blind judge, yet
Professor Kaiser would compel the litigants to go to trial before a jury
which could conceivably include twelve blind jurors-for if one blind
person must be allowed to sit, how can we then exclude the second,
third and fourth?
CONCLUSION
Military service is one of the highest forms of service a citizen can
perform for his country, yet few would argue that the blind person has
a right to enlist. It seems safe to say that a blind person is unqualified
to serve, for example, as an artillery spotter-he could not see what he
was shooting at. The perceptually handicapped juror is at exactly the
same disadvantage in the trial of a modem lawsuit.
The right to trial by jury belongs to the litigants. There is no right
of individuals to insist they be called for jury duty, or to insist that they
be seated once they are summoned. If the parties to a lawsuit can be
forced to accept perceptually handicapped jurors then their constitu-
tional right to trial by jury has been fundamentally altered.
